Judges who answer to the department prosecuting the case
An immigration judge is not a judge in the constitutional sense. He is an attorney employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a component of the Department of Justice, and he serves under the Attorney General, whose Department also prosecutes the removal case in front of him.
The regulations try to square that circle. Immigration judges “shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion” in the cases before them. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b). The Supreme Court held in 1954 that when a regulation confers discretion on an adjudicator, the adjudicator must actually exercise it; a decision dictated from above is not a decision at all. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). EOIR’s own policy memorandum on judicial independence, PM 25-42 (Aug. 22, 2025), restates both points. It says that “no EOIR employee or officer can direct any adjudicator to rule in a particular way,” that “pressure from other employees or officers” is an inappropriate factor in deciding a case, and that judges must follow “any relevant federal court orders.”
The same memorandum then says the following. “Adjudicatory outliers or statistically improbable outcome metrics,” measured against the rest of the judge corps, “may be indicative of a systematic bias or failure to adhere to applicable law that warrants close examination and potential action.” And it reminds every judge that nothing limits the Attorney General’s authority over adjudicators, “all of whom are inferior officers subject to both appointment and removal,” quoting the Supreme Court for the proposition that the President may remove officers “in whom he has simply lost confidence.”
A judge who reads that memorandum learns two things. No one may order a particular ruling. And rulings that depart from the average can end a career.
The firings, the stated reason, and the monitoring
The record below is drawn from public documents: a White House release, EOIR’s policy memoranda, the briefs filed in the Federal Circuit over the firings, a complaint filed by a fired judge, and a sworn declaration by another.
The firings. According to the brief the National Association of Immigration Judges filed in the Federal Circuit on August 4, 2026, the Department began dismissing probationary judges in February 2025 and, as of July 2026, had terminated “almost 40” judges who had completed probation, invoking Article II of the Constitution and taking the position that the civil-service protections Congress wrote for them are unconstitutional. No individual explanation was given in any case. That count covers judges past probation; EOIR Insights, this firm’s own tracking of reported departures, counts 60 immigration judges fired or pushed out since January 2025, each entry resting on a named press report or court filing. The lead challenge, Jackler v. Merit Systems Protection Board, No. 26-1575, is before the full Federal Circuit; argument is set for December 10, 2026. It has not been decided.
The stated reason. On April 9, 2026, the White House published a release titled “Era of Amnesty Is Over.” It states that the President has been “replacing activist judges — who slow-walked deportations and granted asylum at sky-high rates — with professionals committed to enforcing the law,” and continues: “No more activist judges shielding criminal illegals. No more endless delays. Only results.” It reports that asylum “is now granted in just 7% of cases.”
The monitoring. The judges’ association brief recounts that beginning in May 2025, Assistant Chief Immigration Judges told sitting judges that their hearings were being monitored. It quotes the acting Attorney General, as reported by the Washington Post on May 6, 2026: judges who are “not applying the law in the way that it needs to be applied, delaying inappropriately, have backlogs that are just unacceptable, they’re the folks that we’re going to try to find somebody different to fill that spot,” and of new hires, “then we’ll watch them.” The brief also cites the New York Times’ April 2026 report that more than two dozen immigration judges who served under this administration “described feeling a consistent sense of pressure to deport immigrants or risk losing their jobs,” and a Department job posting, first published in November 2025, that advertises the position as “deportation judge.”
The Department’s position. In its own brief in Jackler, filed August 28, 2026, the Department acknowledges that judges must decide cases independently, while asserting that a judge’s adjudicative decisions may be considered in deciding whether to remove that judge. Those two positions are not reconcilable. If rulings can get a judge fired, the threat of firing shapes rulings.
Two former judges describe the instructions they received
Two former immigration judges have described specific instructions they say they received. One account is in a complaint filed in federal court; the other is a sworn declaration. Both are allegations the government has not yet answered, and they are presented here as such.
Judge Chloe Dillon, San Francisco. In a complaint filed September 10, 2026 in the Northern District of California, Dillon v. Blanche, No. 3:26-cv-10143, a former San Francisco immigration judge alleges the following. On April 22, 2025, the Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for her court emailed all judges that ICE’s motions to change venue should be granted and denied only in “rare circumstances.” She objected that the directive conflicted with the Board’s precedent, Matter of Rahman, which commits venue to the judge’s discretion, and that transferring detained cases away from local counsel could cost respondents their lawyers. She alleges the supervisor replied that “the White House” was paying attention and that she should be careful about pushing the issue.
On August 20, 2025, she alleges, an unrepresented man appeared early for his master calendar hearing in a suit. The ICE attorney made an oral motion to dismiss his case so that he could be placed in expedited removal. When the judge asked whether any federal court order bore on what was about to happen, the ICE attorney told her it was “none of [her] concern.” She gave the man a short continuance to find a lawyer. He was arrested as he left the courtroom. Reviewing the file that afternoon, she concluded he was almost certainly a designated unaccompanied minor who could not lawfully be placed in expedited removal, and she emailed her supervisor that she was concerned about violations of statutory law and due process. Approximately 48 hours later, the complaint alleges, she received a letter from the acting director of EOIR terminating her “pursuant to Article II of the Constitution.” The complaint states that of the 22 judges on the San Francisco court in 2025, nearly 20 were fired that year.
Judge Jenny Beverly, Chelmsford, Massachusetts. In a declaration executed June 2, 2026 and filed in Advocates for Human Rights v. EOIR, No. 1:26-cv-00865 (D.D.C.), a former judge states that before a June 5, 2025 hearing for a teenager arrested by ICE, her Assistant Chief Immigration Judge directed her to start the hearing thirty minutes before the posted time, to admit no observers on WebEx other than the detention facility, to claim “technical difficulties” if anyone asked, and to finish before the posted time so that the press and the public could not watch. She refused. She kept the hearing open, started on time, and admitted more than a hundred observers. She resigned the following month and states that those instructions contributed to her decision.
Immigration hearings are open to the public by regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27. Her declaration describes a supervisor directing a judge to close one and to misstate the reason.
A tribunal with a stake in the outcome
The objection is not that immigration judges are biased people. It is that the conditions of their employment create a risk of bias that the Constitution does not tolerate, whether or not any judge consciously yields to it.
That is settled law. Due process does not require a litigant to prove what a judge was privately thinking; it prohibits adjudication under circumstances that present an unacceptable risk of bias. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). A century ago the Supreme Court set aside convictions by a mayor who was paid twelve dollars from each fine he imposed. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). The judges’ association makes the comparison directly: a bonus of a few hundred dollars for each asylum denial would plainly violate due process, and the threat of losing a judicial salary for granting asylum is, in economic terms, the same thing. The Court said as far back as 1871 that a judicial officer must be “free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871).
The government’s answers do not meet the objection. That the Attorney General may constitutionally appoint and remove immigration judges, as the Ninth Circuit held in Duenas v. Garland, 78 F.4th 1069 (2023), does not mean the Attorney General may use that power to dictate the result in a case. The Supreme Court recognized in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), that the Attorney General could not direct the Board’s decisions under the governing regulations. And the Department’s instruction to its judges in September 2025, PM 25-45, that they “cannot consider structural constitutional challenges to their own existence,” does not answer an as-applied objection: that in this proceeding, on this record, pressure displaced judgment. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), preserved exactly that kind of challenge.
Nor is this an objection to an adverse ruling. A litigant who loses cannot cry bias because he lost; the Board and the Supreme Court have said so. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994); Matter of Exame, 18 I. & N. Dec. 303 (B.I.A. 1982). The objection here rests on evidence outside the ruling: the memoranda, the firings, the public statements, and the accounts of judges who were told what to do.
Why due process is not available in immigration court today
Due process, at its core, means notice and a fair hearing before a neutral decision-maker. The hearing can be imperfect in many ways and still be a hearing. What it cannot be is a hearing before someone whose livelihood depends on the result.
The record above shows that condition is not met in immigration court today, and not only in hard cases.
First, the judges are removable at will, and the Department has removed them. That is not a theory; it is the Department’s own litigating position in the Federal Circuit, acted on dozens of times: almost forty non-probationary judges by the association’s count, sixty judges in all by EOIR Insights’ tally of reported departures.
Second, the stated basis for removal is outcomes. The White House release says the administration is replacing judges who “granted asylum at sky-high rates.” The policy memorandum tells judges that statistical outliers face “potential action.” The Department’s brief says rulings may be considered in deciding whom to remove. A judge does not need to be told how to rule in a given case. He has been told what rulings cost.
Third, the pressure is reaching individual decisions. Two judges have described being directed to grant the government’s motions, to close a public hearing and misstate the reason, and being warned that “the White House” was watching. One of them was fired two days after reporting what she believed were violations of law.
Fourth, the avenues for correcting this from inside the system are closed. The Department has told its judges they may not consider structural challenges to their own independence. The judges’ association tried to raise the problem in court and was told, in August 2026, that its complaint belongs before the civil-service board whose authority over these firings the Department disputes. A judge who speaks publicly about any of this needs supervisory approval to do so. The people best placed to say the system is compromised are the people who cannot say it.
Put those together and the conclusion follows. A tribunal whose members can be dismissed for their rulings, that has been told which rulings are disfavored, and that has no internal means of objecting, is not a neutral tribunal. A person in removal proceedings may still win. Judges still grant relief; some will risk their positions to do so. But a right that depends on the courage of the individual judge is not a right. It is a chance.
Sources. EOIR Policy Memoranda 25-42, Adjudicator Independence and Impartiality (Aug. 22, 2025), and 25-45, Consideration of Constitutional Arguments in Agency Adjudications (Sept. 5, 2025); White House, “Era of Amnesty Is Over: President Trump Restores Rule of Law to Immigration Courts” (Apr. 9, 2026); Brief of the National Association of Immigration Judges as Amicus Curiae, and Brief for Intervenor Department of Justice, Jackler v. Merit Systems Protection Board, No. 26-1575 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4 and Aug. 28, 2026); Complaint, Dillon v. Blanche, No. 3:26-cv-10143 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2026); Declaration of Jenny V. Beverly, Advocates for Human Rights v. EOIR, No. 1:26-cv-00865 (D.D.C. filed June 9, 2026); Margolin v. National Association of Immigration Judges, No. 25-767 (U.S. May 26, 2026), and the court of appeals’ August 2026 decision on remand; Amica Center for Immigrant Rights v. EOIR, No. 1:26-cv-00696 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2026); Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project v. EOIR, No. 1:25-cv-03299 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2026); The Advocates for Human Rights v. Blanche, No. 1:26-cv-00865 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2026).